Long-term development policy and international cooperation are a prerequisite for ensuring that democracy education and human rights continue to be upheld in questions of global responsibility. This is not a given in a world where democracy has been in decline for the past 20 years and in a time where the rule-based world order is in crisis.
At this stage, in addition to the four years of Russia’s war of aggression, Donald Trump has become emblematic of the rule-based recession. This holds particular significance for development cooperation, as according to Similä (2026), organisations are losing power in the world of Trump. In other words, the international system that seeks to support peace, security and stability to the best of its ability does not serve Trump’s desire to claim Greenland or win the Nobel Peace Prize arbitrarily.
It is not just a question of undermining the legitimacy of the US leadership, however, but of a development that cuts across societies on a larger scale. This culminates in the “Board of Peace”, established to resolve the conflict in Gaza, whose charter is based on Trump’s personal autocracy and $1 billion entry fees. The key thing is that, while the plan follows the structure of an international agreement and organisation, it justifies Trump’s lifelong and even hereditary exercise of power. The United States would therefore not be a party to the charter unless the Senate decides so. (Scheinin 2026) Another key point is that mentions of Gaza have shifted towards promoting a more general “peace”. Trump has suggested the “Board of Peace” could act as a competitor to the United Nations, which has also been picked up by state representatives pursuing their own interests. This is evident in more or less all the states that have agreed to join the “Board of Peace”, such as Indonesia, which backs Subianto’s oligarchic populism, and Hungary, known for Orbán’s Euroscepticism and nationalist populism. (Pikkarainen 2026)
At the same time, development cooperation has faced US-led cuts that simply cannot be afforded given the global North–South imbalance, as Lehtinen (2025) and Saarenheimo (2025) have previously pointed out in SYL’s blog. This approach does not recognise global responsibility, although it affects all of us across national borders. It encompasses the principle that even non-participants are exposed to either negative or positive externalities, which can be either minimised or maximised to promote sustainable development.
In addition to corporate responsibility, the role of states is emphasised through internationally formed cooperation structures: for example, the European Union with its Member States is the world’s largest funder of public development cooperation. (Kuisma et al. 2021) However, even funders must ask themselves how responsive development aid is to shifts in the global environment. This is because the current priorities of development policy lean towards the conditions of democratic consolidation or transitions from authoritarian to democratic environments (Development Policy Committee 2024). Yet they are not suitable as such for the situations of countries in democratic decline.
The number of liberal democracies peaked (44) in 2009, but in 2022, the proportion of the world’s population living in non-democratic countries returned to 1986 levels. According to the V-Dem Institute, 72% of the world’s population live under varying degrees of autocracy, i.e. political systems where formal elections are held but the regime is not democratic. (Development Policy Committee 2024) Such electoral autocracies include Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tunisia. The decline in freedom of expression became apparent in the Mozambican general election, for example, when the authorities blocked internet access on all mobile devices to prevent the dissemination of anti-government information (Tilli 2025).
The most significant deterioration of democracy has occurred in middle-income countries, for example in Latin America, Europe and Central Asia. A total of 42 countries, home to 43% of the world’s population, are becoming more autocratic in nature. This is partly explained by the large population of India. (Development Policy Committee 2024) At the same time, only 6.6% of the world’s population lives in fully democratic countries (Tilli 2025).
Overlapping crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and the cost-of-living crisis, have affected the living conditions of the poorest in particular. On the other hand, faith in democracy has also been undermined by the Global North’s high-handed measures in combating migration and inequalities in vaccine coverage. Development cooperation should not be a continuum of colonial relations in these frameworks. It may be perceived as such, however, meaning that the right to self-determination is equated with authoritarianism by undemocratic leaders (Development Policy Committee 2024). It is noteworthy that authoritarians are not dependent on development aid funding, which calls for decision-making based on human rights and democracy. Particularly in trade and security policy, there is a need to harmonise the contradictions of democracy support in this respect.
Ultimately, it is important to get back to basics: that democracy is not something you can commercialise and import but an intrinsic need arising from the country and its citizens. Alongside sharing information, resources and good practices with the voice of the Global North, it would be equally important to identify and learn from the democratic innovations of the Global South. For example, “hybrid” participatory processes have been identified in Africa, and participatory budgeting introduced in Latin America has since seen use in Finland. (Development Policy Committee 2024)
And even when there are means, development cooperation projects must consider the long-term approach to the work, especially when it comes to cultural attitudes and behavioural change related to slowing down the deterioration of democracy rather than to strengthening it and to protecting valuable existing activities. In this case, support for democracy is seen as a totality in which democratic institutions, the rule of law and civil society dynamically interact (Development Policy Committee 2024). What makes democracy work rewarding, however, is that civil society is not so much a state or local space as a supranational statement that transcends national borders.
Sources:
Development Policy Committee. 2024:1. Democracy needs strengthening everywhere. From: https://www.kehityspoliittinentoimikunta.fi/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2024/04/dpc-democracy-needs-strenghtening-everywhere-final-pdf.pdf
Kuisma, M., Liappis, H., Pentikäinen, M., Silvola, H. 2021. Globaali vastuu: Käsite ja indikaattorit Suomen kestävän kehityksen edistämiseksi. Opinio Juris. From: Valtioneuvoston kanslian tilaama selvitys Suomen verrokkimaissa käytössä olevista ja kansainvälisissä järjestöissä kehitetyistä globaalin vastuun indikaattoreista (in Finnish)
Pikkarainen, E. 2026. Grafiikat näyttävät, millainen Trumpin “rauhanneuvostosta” on tulossa. Helsingin Sanomat. From: https://www.hs.fi/maailma/art-2000011765855.html (in Finnish)
Scheinin, M. 2026. Donald Trumpin rauhanneuvosto on suuruudenhullu rakennelma. Helsingin Sanomat. From: https://www.hs.fi/mielipide/art-2000011763130.html (in Finnish)
Similä, V. 2026. Maailma muuttui lopullisesti sunnuntaina kello 17.15. Helsingin Sanomat. From: https://www.hs.fi/kirjeenvaihtajat/art-2000011759592.html (in Finnish)
Tilli, R. 2025. Two decades of decline in the global state of democracy. Demo Finland. From: https://demofinland.org/en/two-decades-of-decline-in-the-global-state-of-democracy/
